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Introduction
In the mid-1960s, as the U.S. effort to bring widespread change to the social,
economic, and political fabric of rural South Vietnam was getting under way,
a representative of the United States Official Mission (USOM) in that coun-
try stumbled across evidence of large-scale corruption among officials of the
South Vietnamese government (known in U.S. terminology as Government of
Vietnam, or GVN). The USOM official was stationed in the Mekong Delta,
which crammed some 70 percent of the South Vietnamese population into
25 percent of its land area and was a key base of support for the Communist
insurgents that made up the National Liberation Front (NLF). The official
worried that the corruption he had uncovered “had implications all over the
Delta,” but he did not feel he had the authority to intervene directly in the
GVN’s affairs. Instead he made discreet inquiries to try to learn the facts and
report them to his superiors in USOM. One night, after being invited by the
local chief of police to take a ride to inspect a pro-government outpost, he felt
a gun pressed against the back of his neck. The police chief, far from wanting
to uproot corruption, wanted to intimidate the U.S. official and put an end
to his questions. Afterward, the U.S. mission in Saigon took no action against
the police chief and instead offered to transfer the badly shaken representative
to another province. This episode was typical of U.S. attempts to transform
a foreign society in which loyalties were opaque, power dynamics were never
quite as they seemed, and individual U.S. reformers often found themselves
alone.1
1. This story was related by one of the representative’s superiors in Saigon. See Debrief No. 146612,
pp. 9–10, in Box 99, Allan E. Goodman Papers (GP), Hoover Institution Archives (HIA), Stanford
University.
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From the formation of an Office of Rural Affairs in 1962 until the fi-
nal winding down of the U.S. presence in 1973, thousands of U.S. civilians
traveled to the provinces and villages of South Vietnam. Acting as advisers to
provincial and district governments throughout the country, they were sup-
posed to strengthen these vital links between the GVN and the people of
South Vietnam. From the time South Vietnam was formed in 1954, it had
been a quintessential weak state. Unable to extract human resources and taxes
from its own rural population, the GVN had been reliant on infusions of U.S.
aid. The only way the South Vietnamese government could have overcome its
reliance on what one historian has called its “American power source” was by
developing administrative institutions that were both locally effective and re-
sponsive to the center.2 Working with—or sometimes against—their South
Vietnamese counterparts, U.S. personnel were charged with imparting this
type of government to the country.
To explore the U.S. nation-building project in South Vietnam from the
perspective of the thousands of advisers who worked in it, this article intro-
duces a new source base into the literature: a collection of official debrief-
ings of rural advisory personnel found in the Allan E. Goodman Papers at
Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.3 The debriefings were conducted in
Honolulu at the Asia Training Center of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and include not only USAID officials but also per-
sonnel from other civilian agencies and U.S. military advisers who were in-
volved in the rural advisory effort in South Vietnam. Although the interviews
do not provide exhaustive coverage of field advisory personnel, they cover all
regions of South Vietnam and stretch from 1963 to 1973. The issues dis-
cussed here reflect viewpoints found across a broad section of the debriefings.
When taken together with archival material from other sources—including
additional oral histories, personal letters, and government documents from
2. Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington, DC: U.S. Center
for Military History, 1998), p. 497.
3. Some of these interviews are also available in the National Archives II facility at College Park,
Maryland. The extensive collection in the Goodman Papers has not, to my knowledge, previously been
cited by researchers. Some 112 interviews, which have an average length of 22 pages, were reviewed
in the preparation of this article. Because of a restriction imposed by Goodman’s deed of gift to the
Hoover Institution, which bans the identification of any person still living, the individuals whose
words are being cited cannot in all cases be named, nor can precise details be given of when and where
they served in South Vietnam. Instead, broader descriptions such as “a Province senior adviser who
served in the Delta just after the Americanization of the war” are used. For extended discussions of
individuals, pseudonyms such as “Mike” are assigned in addition to these descriptions. As printing
the folder titles themselves would in some cases violate the deed of gift, interviews are instead cited by








s_a_00984.pdf by guest on 24 April 2021
Gawthorpe
the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum, the Vietnam Center and
Archive at Texas Tech University, and the U.S. National Archives—this col-
lection provides an unparalleled look into the challenges of nation-building as
viewed from the ground up.
The documents give new insight both into the nuances of U.S.-
Vietnamese relations in the nation-building program and into the way the
United States attempted to generate on a crash basis the thousands of skilled
personnel needed to carry out such a program. Dispatched to a foreign coun-
try of which they knew little, advisers struggled with a lack of linguistic ability
and an incomplete understanding of the political, cultural, and social context
within which they operated. Training programs designed to overcome these
problems proved of dubious use. Even if advisers had possessed perfect infor-
mation, they had limited ways to act on it. The regime they were charged
with reforming often worked at cross-purposes with U.S. goals. Although the
United States fielded hundreds of thousands of soldiers in South Vietnam and
unleashed massive firepower on the country, this formidable military might
was of little use in achieving reform on the part of a corrupt and inefficient
South Vietnamese government.
This basic non-fungibility of military power meant that rural advisers
could not achieve their goals by relying on the violence and coercion that one
author has claimed was characteristic of the “real American war in Vietnam.”4
Instead, faced with the necessity of nation-building in South Vietnam and the
uselessness of military force for this task, the United States tried to construct
a network of rural advisers knowledgeable about South Vietnam and skilled
in the arts of persuasion, cajolery, and manipulation.
The need to recruit, train, and deploy thousands of rural advisers as
the war intensified—and to do so quickly—had ramifications both for the
quality of advisers’ preparation and the extent to which they worked accord-
ing to a grand, unified plan. Historians of Cold War nation-building efforts
have often focused on the efforts’ ideological wellsprings, and students of the
impact of modernization theory have examined thinkers and policymakers
4. Nick Turse, Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam (New York: Picador,
2013). See also Bernd Greiner, War without Fronts: The USA in Vietnam (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2009). For critiques, see Gary Kulik and Peter Zinoman, “Misrepresenting Atrocities: Kill Any-
thing That Moves and the Continuing Distortions of the War in Vietnam,” Cross-Currents: East Asian
History and Culture Review, No. 12 (September 2014), pp. 162–198; and the forum “U.S. Conduct in
the Vietnam War: Commentaries on Bernd Greiner’s War without Fronts,” Journal of Cold War Studies,
Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 2011), pp. 185–214, which includes critiques by Andrew J. Bacevich, Edwin
Moïse, and Mark Atwood Lawrence plus a reply by Greiner. Greiner’s reply prompted further critiques
by Bacevich and Moïse in “Responses to Bernd Greiner on U.S. Conduct in Vietnam,” Journal of Cold
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in the metropole while recognizing that more work remains to be done on
how U.S. nation-building programs actually operated on the ground.5 Re-
sponding to that call, this article argues that “high modernist” projects—such
as President Lyndon Johnson’s plan for a “TVA [Tennessee Valley Author-
ity] on the Mekong”—were difficult to implement in the chaotic, confusing,
and menacing environment that rural advisers confronted in Vietnam.6 Nei-
ther the GVN nor the U.S. personnel in South Vietnam were able to mo-
bilize the power and resources for such sweeping transformations. Instead,
when the nation-building effort is viewed from the perspective of the in-
dividual advisers, their defining experience was a lack of power—either the
power to understand their environment or the power to change it. The same
held true for the U.S. reform project in Vietnam writ large. Given these fac-
tors, the precise ideas and principles that underlay the design of U.S. reform
efforts recede in importance because they could rarely be implemented as
intended.7
To relate the story of the U.S. rural advisory network in South Vietnam,
the article proceeds in three sections. The first sketches the growth of the
network aimed at solidifying the South Vietnamese regime by improving its
ability to administer its rural population. This section demonstrates how the
field advisory network grew from a small, jerry-rigged expedient into a vast
bureaucracy consisting of specially trained personnel. The second section uses
oral histories and archived training materials to examine the quality of the
advisers’ training and the impact it had on their ability to understand and
influence rural South Vietnam. The final section then uses oral histories and a
range of other archival materials to explore how effective U.S. personnel were
at accomplishing this task once in the field.8
5. David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American
World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). See also Michael E. Latham, Mod-
ernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 8, 17; Daniel Immerwahr, “Modernization and Devel-
opment in U.S. Foreign Relations,” Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations
Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 (September 2012), pp. 22–26; and Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem,
the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013),
ch. 1.
6. On “high modernism,” see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the
Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
7. For considerations of these principles, see Patrick Lloyd Hatcher, The Suicide of an Elite: American
Internationalists and Vietnam (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); and Jefferson P. Mar-
quis, “The Other Warriors: American Social Science and Nation Building in Vietnam,” Diplomatic
History, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 79–105.
8. See my book To Build as Well as Destroy: The American Experience of Nation-Building in South
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The Growth of the Field Advisory Network,
1963–1973
U.S. personnel who worked as rural government advisers in South Vietnam
were part of an effort that became larger, more militarized, more bureaucra-
tized, and more urgent as U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War deepened.
What started out in 1962 as a few dozen young men following the example
of the Peace Corps and reading The Ugly American became by 1968 a force of
thousands of older, more experienced, and more cynical civilian and military
officials. What drove this transformation was the need for results in a nation-
building effort intended to facilitate U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam
by fostering a self-sufficient GVN. The odd mixture of Peace Corps idealists
and hard-nosed Cold Warriors who coexisted in the rural advisory network in
South Vietnam at various times during its history makes for a fascinating case
study relevant to the broader history of Cold War development initiatives.
Various U.S. agencies were active in South Vietnam before the Ameri-
canization of the war in 1965. These included the U.S. military under the
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), the USAID officials whose mis-
sion made up USOM, State Department officers in the embassy, and Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel. None of these agencies had an exten-
sive presence in the provinces and villages of South Vietnam, and they rarely
worked together to make the best use of their resources. Although USOM had
deployed personnel to the provinces to help with the resettlement of refugees
from North Vietnam in the 1950s, President Ngo Dinh Diem, ever sensi-
tive to Vietnamese nationalism, had forced their withdrawal in 1958.9 Some
U.S. officials in USOM also resisted the idea that their personnel should be
deployed into the provinces to support local government, believing instead
that USAID should run a “traditional” mission that focused on the GVN’s
central political and economic policymaking institutions in Saigon. They felt
that the guerrilla crisis could best be handled by the military.10 The MAAG
remained focused on preparing South Vietnam’s armed forces (Army of the
Republic of Vietnam, or ARVN) to fight a conventional war. Finally, although
the CIA saw counterinsurgency warfare and the strengthening of GVN local
9. Asia Bureau, Office of Residual Indochina Affairs, Vietnam Desk, “Rural Development and Field
Operations,” in U.S. Agency for International Development, Terminal Report: United States Economic
Assistance to South Vietnam, 1954–1975 (Washington, DC, 1975), pp. 4–5.
10. Ibid., p. 11; William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam: 1962–1965 (Washington,
DC: ARPA, 1966), pp. 48–49; and George K. Tanham et al., War without Guns: American Civilians
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governments as within its sphere of competence, the agency’s efforts
amounted to not even two dozen officers by late 1964.11
In 1962, the Kennedy administration gave impetus to a transformation
of the USOM mission and the creation of the Office of Rural Affairs. That
year, the administration dispatched former CIA officer Rufus Phillips to over-
see the creation of a rural advisory effort. He soon requested that Albert S.
Fraleigh, a USAID official, join him. Together, the two men, who had already
worked on establishing a similar program in Laos, laid the foundations of
what became the largest U.S. wartime nation-building effort in history. Ac-
cording to Fraleigh, the impetus for the expansion came in the aftermath of
a visit to South Vietnam by the soon-to-be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) Maxwell Taylor and deputy National Security Adviser Walt Ros-
tow in late 1961. Fraleigh remembered that the goal of the new effort was to
“help the government of Vietnam decentralize and become more effective and
responsive to the needs of its people.”12
Phillips published a memoir of his experiences, but Fraleigh is less well-
known to historians despite playing as crucial a role in the early leadership of
the Office of Rural Affairs.13 Born in Toronto, he was a naturalized U.S. citi-
zen who described himself as a connoisseur of “rough and wild areas.” During
World War II he served with the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, working to per-
suade Okinawan civilians to refrain from committing suicide after the Battle
of Saipan and instead to accept U.S. resettlement assistance. Shipwrecked on
Okinawa by a typhoon in October 1945 and living in poverty on the beaches
until he could be recovered, Fraleigh remembers being struck by the “sad con-
ditions” of the Okinawans. He recalled: “I felt that we couldn’t have these two
very different standards of living—what we enjoyed and what the Asian peo-
ples were forced to accept—and have world peace very long.” Driven more
by this concern over North-South relations than by the incipient Cold War,
he went to work for the United Nations (UN) relief program in Shanghai in
1946, when China was embroiled in a civil war. In Shanghai, Fraleigh formed
a friendship with Zhou Enlai, who later became foreign minister of the newly
formed People’s Republic of China (PRC). During the civil war, Zhou was
responsible for collecting supplies from the UN relief mission to distribute
in areas under Chinese Communist rule. Following the entry of Communist
11. Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., The CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam (Washington, DC: Center
for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), p. 133.
12. Debrief No. 3672 (Fraleigh), p. 3, in Box 98, GP, HIA.
13. Rufus Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned (Annapolis,
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forces into Shanghai in 1949, Fraleigh remained in the PRC for nearly two
years and was harshly interrogated and subjected to Communist-mandated
indoctrination sessions, which he later credited with honing his fluent Man-
darin. After finally escaping the mainland through an appeal to Zhou, Fraleigh
went to work with USAID in Taiwan in 1952 for nine-and-a-half years, dur-
ing which time he met his Chinese wife. During a brief assignment in Laos,
he met Phillips, and both worked to establish a field role for USAID in that
country. When Phillips wanted to establish a similar program in South Viet-
nam, he summoned Fraleigh from Taiwan.14
Determined to overhaul what they saw as a hidebound and traditionalist
mission, Fraleigh and Phillips recommended that USOM representatives be
stationed permanently in the provinces of South Vietnam to advise province
chiefs on local officials and to act as a conduit through which the local actors
could request resources from the United States. Although Diem had previ-
ously been opposed to having U.S. representatives influencing local govern-
ments in the provinces, the deepening guerrilla crisis and his trust in Phillips
eased his misgivings.15 For the United States, the aim of the program was not
only to attempt to reform local organs of GVN power and make them more
responsive to the people of South Vietnam but also to allow U.S. personnel to
gather more information about what was happening in the South Vietnamese
countryside. This goal was even more important after the overthrow of the
Diem regime in November 1963, when it became obvious that U.S. officials
had been misled by the GVN over the true state of affairs in the countryside.
One Saigon-based official who arrived in mid-1964 remembered that all the
United States knew about GVN performance at that point was “what the gov-
ernment of Vietnam knew that we wanted [to know].” This information gap
made it impossible to know whether U.S. policy was helping to win the war
and build a sustainable GVN.16
Phillips’s and Fraleigh’s efforts amounted to a revolution in the way
USOM operated. When the pair arrived in Saigon, USOM had 120
14. Rufus Phillips et al., “Remembering Bert Fraleigh, 1920–2014,” January 2014, Rural Affairs South
Vietnam (unpublished, copy available from author); Debrief No. 3672 (Fraleigh), p. 1; and Bert
Fraleigh, “The Story of America’s Counterinsurgency Efforts in Vietnam in the Early 1960s,” 1966,
pp. 2–6, in Folder 30, Box 1, in Rufus Phillips Collection (RPC), Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas
Tech University (VCA). (Fraleigh’s memorandum is incorrectly labeled as having been published in
1966.)
15. Rufus C. Phillips III to Charles Stuart Kennedy, 19 July 1995, in Association for Diplomatic
Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, McLean, Virginia (ADST); and Debrief
No. 3672 (Fraleigh), pp. 3–6.
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employees, but only three were stationed outside the capital.17 The two men
set about recruiting a new breed of provincial representatives who would act
as external eyes and ears in the provinces and give advice to province chiefs on
matters of civil government. Unable to elicit volunteers from within USOM,
Phillips and Fraleigh recruited a diverse bunch of experts from outside the
agency. The group included former military officers, personnel from other
U.S. agencies, and Peace Corps volunteers who had served in other coun-
tries. The first provincial representative was a former International Volun-
tary Services volunteer who was dispatched to Phu Yen, a province on the
central coast, in September 1962. Another early recruit was David Hudson,
a free-lance journalist who was willing to have a try at rural reform. Duly
hired, he was dispatched to the southern tip of the delta, a redoubtable NLF
stronghold.18 Some of the U.S. personnel in the program went on to storied
careers in the executive branch, including Richard Holbrooke, John Negro-
ponte, Hamilton Jordan, and Anthony Lake.
The eclectic background of recruits reflected the hostility that Fraleigh
and Phillips felt toward the career USAID bureaucracy and their belief that
amateur outsiders would be more pragmatic and energetic. This early group
of young, idealistic representatives became known as “the Tigers” because of
Fraleigh’s stock motivational phrase, “You can do it, Tiger!”19 This phrase en-
capsulated Fraleigh’s belief that energetic youngsters would outperform more
experienced bureaucrats. He explicitly modeled what he wanted in a recruit
on the young “BA generalists” favored by the Peace Corps, which Fraleigh
later claimed to have had a hand in founding.20 Although some of the recruits
had specific technical skills, especially in agriculture, most did not. As in the
Peace Corps, Fraleigh and Phillips did not believe that representatives should
go into the field with rigid and formulaic instructions; rather, they should
listen to the problems of their local government counterparts and take a prag-
matic approach to helping them. Fraleigh would later approvingly remember
the “Peace Corps type of feeling” among his early recruits.21
If what Fraleigh sought in the Tigers were young men animated by the
ideals of the Peace Corps and possessing a globetrotting spirit and cultural
17. Debrief No. 3672 (Fraleigh), p. 3.
18. Ibid., p. 8; and Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters, p. 130.
19. Debrief No. 3672 (Fraleigh), p. 25.
20. Fraleigh claimed that he was involved in convincing Congressman Clement Zablocki
(D-Wisconsin) of the value of the Peace Corps and that Zablocki then sold the concept to President
John F. Kennedy. See Fraleigh, “The Story of America’s Counterinsurgency Efforts,” p. 12.
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curiosity similar to his own, he openly disdained the unadventurous and even
downright cowardly attitude that he believed was typical of career USAID em-
ployees in South Vietnam. In 1966 he wrote in a letter to a friend: “Among
so many of our civilians there is apathy, unwillingness to accept a hard life
and hard conditions or to make prompt decisions. Yet, a few miles away, less
lucky American men die in battle.”22 Fraleigh compared the USOM employ-
ees’ luxurious living conditions, lack of local understanding, and “big lunches”
to the eponymous “ugly Americans” of Eugene Burdick and William Led-
erer’s novel.23 By contrast, the Tigers received only a small per diem, could go
months without seeing another Westerner, and were often exposed to danger.
Unlike later generations of U.S. personnel in South Vietnam, they lived off
the local economy rather than relying on lavish logistical support. If the ca-
reer bureaucrats were the “ugly Americans,” the Tigers were supposed to be
real-life incarnations of Homer Atkins, the hero of the Burdick-Lederer book
who lived plainly among the local people, not presuming to impose some set
program of change and instead listening to their problems and helping solve
them with adapted know-how.
To the dismay of Fraleigh and Phillips, the “ugly Americans” did not take
this attempt to revolutionize USOM lightly. In the summer of 1964, career
USAID official James “Big Jim” Killen was appointed head of the mission.
Killen questioned whether the provincial agents tended to sap the autonomy
of GVN local government by “institutionalizing an excessive dependence on
the USOM representative to do things they should be doing for themselves?”
Apparently believing the answer to be yes, he accordingly took steps to reduce
the importance and influence of USOM representatives by removing their
ability to control the release of funds and commodities to provincial govern-
ments, which had formerly been used as a means of influence over their GVN
counterparts.24 Killen was a traditionalist who was averse to the Peace Corps
spirit of the Office of Rural Affairs and had little faith in young college gen-
eralists. He also believed that U.S. citizens should maintain a distance from
the Vietnamese, and he even launched security investigations against some of
the Tigers on the spurious grounds that they had homosexual relationships
22. Fraleigh quoted in Francis Wheat to Johnson, 7 July 1966, in Box 221, Subject File, Ex ND 19/CO
312, White House Central Files (WHCF), Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (LBJL),
Austin, TX.
23. William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American (New York: W. W. Norton, 1958).
For Fraleigh’s comments, see Fraleigh, “The Story of America’s Counterinsurgency Efforts,” p. 17; and
Debrief No. 3672 (Fraleigh), p. 10.
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with the Vietnamese with whom they lived and worked in the provinces.25
At the same time, Killen took aim at the principle of giving provincial repre-
sentatives a per diem to live off the local economy and insisted that they be
provided with a higher standard of living as a means of inducing respect from
the Vietnamese.
In late 1964, Killen had Fraleigh recalled to Washington and ejected more
than 30 of the Tigers, believing they should be replaced by older and more ex-
perienced advisers from within USAID. Fraleigh launched a bitter attack on
Killen in interviews conducted as part of his debriefing, arguing that Killen’s
tenure marked the bureaucratization of the Office of Rural Affairs and a de-
parture from the idealism and adaptability he believed were necessary for the
success of the program.26 Fraleigh eventually resigned from USAID altogether
in 1967, disgusted by what he viewed as the gutting of the program he had
helped establish. Back in Washington, one Tiger wrote a ballad titled “The
Legend of James D. Killen” to lament the changes. “The moral of the story,
is plain with A-I-D,” it read, “You don’t work for the people, you work for
bureaucracy!”27
Alongside these disagreements within USAID were the inevitable ten-
sions between any program based on the idealistic and non-prescriptive ap-
proach of the Peace Corps and The Ugly American and the grim necessity that
drove a nation-building effort in a war zone. Secretary of State Dean Rusk
had argued that the Peace Corps could not be viewed as “an instrument of
foreign policy,” because to do so would rob it of its usefulness “to foreign
policy.”28 Instead, the value of the Peace Corps supposedly lay in the image
of thousands of idealistic young Americans toiling selflessly for the benefit of
others rather than for themselves or their own country. The process itself was
more important than any concrete results.29 The Peace Corps did not have
a presence in South Vietnam precisely because of a desire to maintain the
distinction pointed out by Rusk. However, the ranks of the Tigers included
former Peace Corps volunteers who were ready to work more directly for the
25. Fraleigh, “The Story of America’s Counterinsurgency Efforts,” p. 28.
26. Fraleigh’s most personal criticisms were not included in the final printed report published after his
debriefing. For the original comments, see Bert Fraleigh, interview, 3 February 1967, pp. 27–33, in
Folder 16, Box 2, RPC, VCA.
27. “Paper and Song Lyrics—The Greatest Years of The Pig: 1962–1964 in the Rural Areas of South
Vietnam,” n.d., in Folder 30, Box 1, RPC, VCA.
28. Quoted in Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the
1960s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 99.
29. Ibid., ch. 5; and Fritz Fischer, Making Them Like Us: Peace Corps Volunteers in the 1960s (Wash-
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benefit of U.S. foreign policy aims. Some, as Fraleigh remembered approv-
ingly, even hitchhiked their way to the country to sign up.30 But as the sit-
uation in South Vietnam deteriorated in the run-up to the Americanization
of the war in 1965, many U.S. officials in South Vietnam began to ques-
tion whether the attitude that these hitchhiking Tigers brought with them
was commensurate to the task at hand. The core of their critique was that
the rural advisory effort, which was so crucial for U.S. objectives in the war,
was indisputably an instrument of U.S. foreign policy and hence could not
operate the way the Peace Corps did. Most of all, it had to show results.
As the stakes in South Vietnam grew higher, the Peace Corps mantra
that there was no one better for an undefined task than an undefined per-
son seemed less and less convincing as a way to deliver results.31 The growth
in the size and importance of the rural advisory effort attracted the atten-
tion of other government agencies, causing many to question whether “BA
generalists” in their 20s from the Peace Corps or IVS could effectively ad-
vise South Vietnamese province chiefs. In the mid-1960s almost all province
chiefs were field-grade officers with decades of experience fighting the war and
surviving the byzantine politics of the ARVN. “[Y]ou couldn’t get a province
chief to listen to a boy of 22 or 23,” said one USOM official who served
in South Vietnam in 1966, summing up a common perspective. “He knew
he wouldn’t have the experience.”32 Tran Ngoc Chau, the chief of Kien Hoa
Province, remembered that his reaction to seeing the freckled young American
who was supposed to serve as his adviser was to think, “I don’t need any babies
down in this province; I’ve got enough problems.”33 Long-serving agricultural
experts in USOM agreed that young generalists without a technical or vo-
cational background had little to offer.34 Although Fraleigh thought younger
personnel were less rigid in their thinking and more open to foreign cultures,
others detected a youthful arrogance. Some U.S. critics felt that the Tigers’
zeal did not make up for their deficiency in maturity and cultural sensitivity,
meaning they did not have “enough patience to find out what the situation is
before they have all the answers.”35 One adviser even wrote a ditty mocking
30. Debrief No. 3672 (Fraleigh), p. 10.
31. On this point, see Fischer, Making Them Like Us, p. 139.
32. Debrief No. 21666, p. 10, in Box 100, GP, HIA.
33. Quoted in Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters, p. 133.
34. Debrief No. 3672 (Fraleigh), p. 16; and Rutherford Poats and John Bennett, interviewed by
Charles Stuart Kennedy, 2 February 1990, in ADST.
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the pretensions of his youthful colleagues. “Now Colonel, you’re forty, I’m
just twenty-two,” it began, “but I’ve been to college, so I’ll advise you”!36
Killen’s belief that the Office of Rural Affairs should not apply pressure
on South Vietnamese local governments to force them to reform was also con-
trary to the general trend of U.S. activity in South Vietnam. His tenure co-
incided with the Americanization of the war in 1965, which ultimately trans-
formed the rural advisory effort. Not only did the influx of U.S. troops and
assets from 1965 onward provide an as-yet-undreamed-of level of potential
resources to direct toward aiding South Vietnamese local governments, it also
dramatically raised the stakes in the conflict. Simply hoping that the GVN
would start acting properly was no longer sufficient when U.S. soldiers were
dying to protect the Saigon regime. Furthermore, the eventual withdrawal of
these soldiers presupposed that the GVN would attain the effectiveness and
autonomy needed to stand up to the Vietnamese Communists on its own.
This in turn was necessary for the United States to declare victory in a war
in which its own credibility was now at stake. “If we lose in Vietnam,” the
authors of an influential U.S. Army report commented, “we pay the price no
matter how carefully American officials rationalize the need to respect Viet-
namese sovereignty.”37
The strategic need to strengthen the GVN prompted a series of reorga-
nizations of the rural advisory effort by the Johnson administration.38 The
first step was the formation of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) in late
1966, which created a much larger U.S. presence in each locality. Under this
new setup, about half a dozen civilians served under a province representative.
The few Tigers left in the country found themselves no longer qualified for
such a senior position, and those who were not forced to leave became as-
sistants and deputies to the new breed of representatives.39 Where the Tigers
remained, they were submerged into larger organizations. The new province
representatives typically were experienced USAID employees, Foreign Service
Officers (FSOs) with decades of experience, or senior ex-military personnel.
36. CFAA newsletter No. 10, July 1972, p. 1, in Folder “CFAA Newsletters, 1971–72,” Box 45,
HQ MACV, Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, Plans, Programs
and Policies Division, CORDS Historical Working Group Files (hereinafter referred to as CORDS
History Files), Record Group (RG) 472, National Archives II at College Park, Maryland (NARA).
37. U.S. Department of the Army, A Program for the Pacification and Long-term Development of South
Vietnam, Vol. 1 (1966), p. 55.
38. The developments in Washington that underlay these reorganizations are beyond the scope of
this article, which focuses on the views and experiences of personnel in South Vietnam itself. For a
bureaucratic history, see Thomas W. Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support (Washington, DC:
Center of Military History, 1982).
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Still unhappy with the rural advisory effort, the Johnson administration took
the dramatic move in May 1967 of placing it under the auspices of the military
with the creation of the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Devel-
opment Support (CORDS). Although OCO was still headed by a civilian,
roughly half of the field personnel in the rural advisory network were drawn
from the military from this point onward. The transfer of jurisdiction to the
military had become inevitable given the vast quantity of U.S. military person-
nel and resources pouring into South Vietnam from 1965 on, compared to the
relatively paltry contributions of the civilian agencies. It also represented an
attempt by the Johnson administration to kick-start the program and enhance
its ability to influence local governments in South Vietnam. Henceforth, the
chief adviser in each province was known not as a provincial representative but
as a province senior adviser (PSA), and each district of the province likewise
had a district senior adviser (DSA). At the time CORDS was created, roughly
half of PSAs and nearly all DSAs were drawn from the military.
The new titles of the organizations and postings reflected a new focus
on advising and influencing the GVN at all levels. CORDS personnel lacked
the freewheeling autonomy of the Tigers, but they were united into one or-
ganization that could apply pressure up and down the GVN hierarchy. Many
advisers believed this was the only way to achieve results. “The guy that’s
operating as a representative of the United States government to the senior
representative of the Vietnamese government,” commented one USAID offi-
cial who served in 1967, “packs a lot more weight with his suggestions than
some guy who identifies himself with the Peace Corps.”40 Under CORDS,
U.S. provincial organizations were about 30 to 70 individuals strong, and the
district teams subordinate to them were about eight strong. The PSA was in
charge of a large organization that included U.S. personnel, local Vietnamese,
and third-country nationals.
Although historians have tended to regard CORDS as an all-American
organization, it in fact by 1970 employed more Vietnamese and third-country
nationals than it did Americans.41 Many of the non-Americans worked in ad-
ministrative support roles, but two elite groups of them worked for CORDS.
The first were English-speaking Filipinos who were hired by USAID as com-
munity development officers (CDOs). The Filipinos served longer tours than
their U.S. counterparts, and some advisers saw them as providing vital conti-
nuity and community development expertise that they had gained working in
40. Debrief No. 14676, p. 3, in Box 94, GP, HIA.
41. “Opening Statement by Ambassador W. E. Colby,” n.d., p. 12, in Folder “Opening state-
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their own country.42 The Tigers had begun to employ CDOs in 1964, and by
the late 1960s many of them had been in the country for four or five years.
By May 1969, 106 CDOs were working in South Vietnam, averaging more
than two per province.43 “It was what I really wanted to get into when I got
over there,” remembered one U.S. adviser who arrived in 1967, “but I found
that the Filipinos really have it sewed up. You just about have to be a Filipino
to get the job.”44 While keeping would-be U.S. community workers out of a
job, the CDOs had linguistic and cultural skills that were highly prized by the
PSAs for whom they worked. “Area specialists,” another holdover from the
Tigers, constituted the second important group of non-Americans working
for CORDS. PSAs employed these locally hired Vietnamese as translators,
guides, and fixers, as well as executive agents who could be sent to pressure
lower-level GVN officials and integrate into Vietnamese rural life in a way
that Americans could not.
CORDS existed from 1967 to 1973, reaching peak size from 1969 to
1971. As the United States began to withdraw from South Vietnam under
President Richard Nixon and the policy of Vietnamization proceeded, the or-
ganization shrank rapidly in 1971, undermining its influence. At the same
time, its work became all the more important as the GVN nervously looked
ahead to the day when it would have to stand up to the Vietnamese Com-
munists without the aid of U.S. resources. In contrast to the small Office
of Rural Affairs started by Fraleigh and Phillips, CORDS was a bureaucratic
behemoth with formal performance reviews and quantifiable targets measur-
ing advisers’ success in persuading their GVN counterparts to do such things
as recruit local militias, carry out development projects, and hold village elec-
tions. Rather than one or two U.S. advisers per province, under CORDS there
could be hundreds. This constituted a dramatic shift from the freewheeling,
Peace Corps–inspired early days of the rural advisory effort. Although the
strategic importance of the nation-building effort in South Vietnam and the
attention it attracted from other government agencies made this development
inevitable, it also raised the question of whether the United States could train
and deploy thousands of personnel with the sophisticated understanding of
South Vietnamese society and governance needed to work closely with their
GVN counterparts to improve rural governance throughout the country.
42. Debrief No. 26683B, pp. 20–21, in Box 98, GP, HIA.
43. Memorandum, James Zumbrunnen to Lee Braddock, 5 May 1969, in Folder “Effect of the inf co
intens. pacif program/Goals 1970 P+D plan,” Box 9, CORDS History Files, RG 472, NARA.
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“You Don’t Know What on Earth You’re Going
to Do”: The Limits of Preparation
Intimate involvement in the affairs of distant countries was a key feature of
the Cold War experience for the United States, but in South Vietnam this
involvement arguably went further than anywhere else. Thousands of U.S.
advisers served in CORDS during its existence, charged with analyzing the
society, economics, and politics of South Vietnam and persuading their GVN
counterparts to carry out reforms that would strengthen the country’s abil-
ity to stand alone against the Vietnamese Communists. How to generate the
skilled personnel to carry out this charge became a key question for the U.S.
nation-building effort.
Before the advent of CORDS, training programs for rural advisers were
limited or non-existent, partly because many of the Tigers had already worked
in Vietnam and had local knowledge and linguistic abilities. The fact that
Fraleigh and Phillips had to rely on finding such talented and knowledgeable
recruits without the ability to generate them through training had limited the
scale of the program. It also sometimes meant sending recruits into the field
unprepared when needs were urgent, as one of the advisers discovered when
he was dispatched to the crucial province of Kien Hoa with only one hour
of language training.45 Fraleigh and Phillips sent the Tigers into the country-
side with a broad remit to improve the social, economic, and political life of
the rural population by making local institutions more effective and respon-
sive to popular needs, but without extensive formal training.46 CORDS’s vast
personnel requirements called for a different approach.
The creation of CORDS meant that the United States needed to gener-
ate, on a crash basis, thousands of personnel who had the requisite skills, sen-
sitivity, and patience to be rural government advisers. Although many existing
government employees from the military, USAID, and State Department were
slotted into CORDS, an extensive recruitment drive was also launched. In the
twelve-month period ending October 1966, the agency responded to 27,000
inquiries regarding service in Vietnam and ultimately hired 544 people.47 In
April 1967, a cross-agency Vietnam Training Center (VTC) was inaugurated
in Washington to formalize and increase the quality of training. Some 2,000
45. Debrief No. 16612, p. 1, in Box 98, GP, HIA.
46. Bert Fraleigh, interview, 3 February 1967, p. 34.
47. Attachment to memorandum, William Gaud to Marvin Watson, 6 October 1966, in Box 120,
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U.S. citizens passed through the VTC during its existence.48 As part of the
Foreign Service Institute, the VTC provided courses up to ten months long
in which future PSAs and DSAs took classes in Vietnamese language, history,
and culture; the theory and practice of countering revolutionary war; and their
own roles within CORDS.
Course attendees read texts and attended lectures by such luminaries as
the British counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson and former field
personnel such as Fraleigh.49 In theory, trainees were also able to read the
latest provincial reports and speak to CORDS advisers who had previously
worked in the areas to which they were to be assigned. However, they often
did not know what area this would be until they arrived in South Vietnam,
which made the utility of a central training program dubious. One of the
most challenging tasks for any new adviser was getting to know the specific
social, economic, and political factors that were important in the province in
which he served. “I believe it is a basic mistake to regard Vietnam as an ho-
mogenous area for which detailed directives and procedures can be established
at central level and stipulated to be applicable throughout,” James Megellas,
leader of CORDS in II Corps, remarked in 1970. “Even within any specific
CTZ [Corps Tactical Zone] the individual provinces have enough differences
to preclude this type of direction being feasible at regional level, much less
on a country-wide basis.”50 If the new advisers were lucky, they might over-
lap with their predecessors long enough to pick up information from them
on the local situation, but this was not always the case. Given the social and
economic differences between provinces, the quality of the local government
institutions, and the disposition of the local NLF units, advisers faced a steep
learning curve. Yet during their training, they often had no idea whether they
were going to be deployed to an almost entirely peaceful province like An
Giang or a battlefield area near the demilitarized zone.
Reactions to the course were mixed. Language training was a large part of
it, but only a few advisers were able to engage in more than small talk when
they arrived in South Vietnam. Although many province chiefs spoke English
or French, advisers without facility in the Vietnamese language were unable to
speak with the ordinary villagers whom they were supposedly in the province
48. Fraleigh, “The Story of America’s Counterinsurgency Efforts,” p. 34.
49. Debrief No. 6683, p. 2, in Box 97, GP, HIA; and Vietnam Area Studies OCO Training Center,
n.d., in Folder 12, Box 09, John Donnell Collection, VCA.
50. Memorandum by James Megellas to Creighton Abrams, 19 May 1970, p. 36, in Folder “End of
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to help.51 Nor was the language training always in the appropriate dialect.
“Johnny” described his “shock” upon arriving in Quang Tri Province in 1965
and discovering that the locals spoke “such a rude rural central dialect.” A
regionalist rebellion against Saigon that broke out in the province in early
1966 could only have heightened his discomfort at speaking the dialect of
the capital.52 Even the legendary former U.S. Army officer John Paul Vann
requested a leave of absence to develop his poor Vietnamese language skills in
1971—and had his request denied.53
In the view of “Brad,” a USAID official who was assigned to the staff of a
GVN agency in 1966 and hence saw the relationship from the other side, the
poor standard of English spoken by GVN officials often caused the U.S. ad-
visers to view them as intellectually inferior.54 One Saigon-based adviser who
traveled to many provinces as a program auditor reported being “terrifically”
impressed in the mid-1960s that “you could go to practically any province and
you found people who spoke English.” Although urbane GVN officials like
Nguyen Duc Thang, a high-ranking favorite of the United States, were ac-
corded respect for their linguistic skills, the many Vietnamese who could not
match them were looked down upon.55 Thomas Barnes, the head of CORDS
in the populous Mekong Delta in 1971, even issued a directive banning ad-
visers from speaking in “baby talk” to their counterparts because it demeaned
the relationship.56 Because more highly educated GVN officials from urban
backgrounds—including many who had received education or military train-
ing in the United States—were easier for U.S. personnel to talk to, the range of
Vietnamese perspectives they heard was inevitably limited by poor linguistic
skills.
Some U.S. recruits found the part of the training course dealing with
revolutionary warfare to be revelatory. A rural development adviser who at-
tended the course in 1967 remembered it as his first introduction to the idea
that insurgencies had political causes and needed political solutions. Despite
51. Debrief No. 86711, pp. 1–2, in Box 99, GP, HIA; Debrief No. 30663, p. 7, in Box 99, GP, HIA;
and Debrief No. 25672, pp. 14–15, in Box 99, GP, HIA.
52. Debrief No. 206612, p. 1, in Box 101, GP, HIA.
53. Memorandum by George Jacobson to William Colby, 29 January 1971, in Folder “Mr Jacobson /
Misc files/A C of S/Folder III,” Box 36, CORDS History Files, RG 472, NARA.
54. Debrief No. 23666, pp. 1–2, in Box 94, GP, HIA.
55. Debrief No. 21666, pp. 20–22. On Nguyen Duc Thang’s relationship with U.S. personnel, see
James McAllister, “What Can One Man Do? Nguyen Duc Thang and the Limits of Reform in South
Vietnam,” Journal of Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 2009), pp. 117–153.
56. Message, Thomas J. Barnes to all PSAs, 7 October 1971, p. 2, in Folder “Barnes, Thomas J.,” Box
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his recent introduction to the topic, he felt that “if a person took any interest
in the course at all that it became clearto [sic] him fairly soon what causes an
insurgency and how you must deal with it.”57 But most found, upon arriving
in their assigned province, the situation to be hugely discombobulating and
soon had a more modest view of their capabilities. One PSA who served on
the central coast in 1968 found that he had not really been able to imagine
the reality of “what you’re going to be doing in Asia” from the comfort of
a classroom.58 An assistant province adviser who had received six months of
training, including five months working on the language, remembered,
When you first get out to a province you are bewildered, you don’t know what
on earth you’re going to do. You really haven’t been told, except in a general sort
of way, exactly what it is you’re supposed to do.59
Some advisers complained of more quotidian experiences of culture shock
of the sort that U.S. travelers abroad have long voiced. “Felix,” a natural-
ized Filipino-American, found he could not distinguish between the various
provinces of South Vietnam upon arrival “since they all seemed to have simi-
lar names.” He also complained about encounters with “shoeshine boys” who
obliged him to pay them whether he wanted their service or not.60 Although
“Felix” felt that his previous experience of living in the Philippines had helped
cushion him from the culture shock of arriving in South Vietnam, most U.S.
recruits had not had similar preparation.
Many of the Tigers had worked in South Vietnam for years and gained an
understanding of Vietnamese language, culture, and history. The post-1965
advisory network instead operated on the principle that older individuals with
no experience of Vietnam could be taught these things and then sent into the
field to become agents of change in the rural South. “Johnny,” the adviser
who discovered he spoke the wrong dialect only upon arriving in Quang Tri,
replaced a Tiger who had been in the province for three-and-a-half years.61
Fraleigh had believed that young minds were the most adaptable to new cul-
tures and less prone to be prescriptive and rigid in their view of what was to
be done to aid local governments. By contrast, many of the VTC inductees
were already experienced professionals whose worldviews were more difficult
to mold in just several months of training. For instance, although experts in
57. Debrief No. 18694, p. 10.
58. Debrief No. 16683, p. 3, in Box 99, GP, HIA.
59. Debrief No. 6683, p. 7.
60. Debrief No. 26683B, pp. 2, 12.








s_a_00984.pdf by guest on 24 April 2021
Gawthorpe
“cross-cultural communication” were retained as instructors, many course at-
tendees reportedly believed they had little to be taught in this area.62 “Earl,”
who arrived in Vietnam in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, recalled the
following incident:
We had somebody from the Justice Department who got up and started crying
about militant black power; about the Negro who had been abused; about a
poor woman down in Alabama who was merely taking her clothes home to wash
them after hours from the laundry and [was] accused of stealing. I could see right
through their scheme. It was to make somebody who was a segregationist blow
up and make a scene in the classroom. It did make you boil to sit there and hear
that crap.63
Although the training program made an effort to filter out those with racist
views, “Earl’s” experience shows how difficult this was.
Given the vastly increased personnel requirements of CORDS, it was im-
possible to produce advisers with homogenous views on the scale required.
Combined with the fact that many rural advisers did not attend a training
course at all because the need for immediate deployment of personnel in Viet-
nam was so great, the result was a wide diversity of views among the advisers
about what their job entailed and how best to accomplish it. To understand
how the U.S. nation-building project in South Vietnam actually operated, we
must take account not only of contemporary ideological tendencies such as
modernization theory but also the sheer multiplicity of worldviews, experi-
ences, and temperaments that inevitably existed among such a large number
of people.64
Understanding and Influencing Rural
South Vietnam
The need to train and deploy thousands of rural government advisers on a
crash basis means that the thousands of recruits who went to fill the ranks
of CORDS defy easy generalization. How advisers conceptualized their roles
depended on their own predilections and backgrounds. Some saw themselves
62. Evaluation of the Province Senior Advisor Training Program, n.d., p. 1, in Folder “PER Vietnam
Training Center, 1970,” Box 8, Subject Files of the Office of Vietnam Affairs (Vietnam Working
Group), 1964–74, RG 59, NARA.
63. Debrief No. 4696, p. 2, in Box 98, GP, HIA.
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as engaged in “missionary” work. As one PSA with a background in both the
U.S. Air Force and USAID explained, this mission involved spreading educa-
tional and social benefits to less-fortunate peoples. This seemed to occasion
some pride. “You are unique,” he explained, “you are going to accept the re-
sponsibilities of the job of helping other people without giving a great deal
of thought to your own personal safety.”65 This focus on “helping people”
allowed the advisers to differentiate their role from that of the majority of
gun-wielding U.S. soldiers in South Vietnam. “This is why Americans are in
Vietnam,” said one U.S. adviser who was stationed in Dinh Tuong Province
in 1967–1968.
They’re not there to fight the war—they’re there to work with the Vietnamese
civilians and try to help them on as personal a basis as can be established. The
little bit that our civilians can accomplish is really worthwhile. They can show
the Vietnamese that the Americans aren’t the big bad guys that the soldiers in the
field seem to be. We’re not just out there killing innocent women and children.
Sure this happens many times; it’s unavoidable in war. But our civilians can show
the Vietnamese that that’s not our mission.66
Although some advisers carried weapons for self-defense, especially in highly
insecure areas such as Quang Tri Province, others felt that carrying weapons
would cause villagers to associate them with the military and view them less
positively.67
Some advisers conceived of their goal as bringing the benefits of social,
economic, and political development to the less fortunate, and their views fit
broadly within the mainstream of modernization discourse. Others were dis-
missive and even contemptuous of this point of view. Some advisers were clear
that their role was not primarily to help the people of South Vietnam but to
strengthen its government. This might involve making the South Vietnamese
province and district administrations more responsive to the needs of their
people, but it was an important distinction. As one PSA with two-and-a-half
years of experience explained: “Your primary purpose in going overseas is the
interest of the United States government. It is not the interest of Vietnam—
this is our foreign policy that we are implementing.”68 One holdover from the
era of the Tigers was openly contemptuous of what he regarded as a “pathetic
reliance on the belief that good works like fertilizer and improved rice seed are
65. Debrief No. 10668, p. 4.
66. Debrief No. 24687, p. 18, in Box 98, GP, HIA.
67. Debrief No. 11679, p. 6, in Box 94, GP, HIA; and Debrief No. 27682, p. 7, in Box 100, GP, HIA.
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an end in themselves without regard to the political implications these things
involve.”69
For advisers from this school of thought, helping the GVN to help its
own people was a means to the end of strengthening the Saigon regime in
pursuit of U.S. war aims. Only when the GVN had something to offer its
population could it hope to win their allegiance in the battle with the NLF.
One ex-military adviser explained how he viewed his task:
We should sort of complete the circuit between some form of Vietnamese gov-
ernment and the people it serves as well as governs. Until we provide some evi-
dence that the government’s concerned about its constituents, I think we’ll just
have an open circuit. So we’re trying to plug this in and make it a flow of infor-
mation, a flow of loyalty.70
This view coexisted in the adviser’s mind with the more developmentalist no-
tion that the United States should help South Vietnam “raise its sights” so
that it could survive economically “in today’s world.”71 Strategic and develop-
ment goals mixed easily because helping the GVN to respond to the social,
economic, and political needs of its citizens also served the strategic goal of
fortifying the GVN.
Latent or explicit racism, as well as assumptions about Vietnamese society
and culture, affected how advisers viewed rural South Vietnam and their role
as agents of change within it. As has frequently been the case in U.S. citizens’
encounters with foreign peoples, race acted as a double-edged sword: it could
act as a marker that a foreign people was waiting to be uplifted by being made
an object of the outsiders’ civilizing mission, and it could simultaneously be
seen as a sign that the same people would never be capable of climbing the
ladder of civilization. During training, advisers read a document titled “The
Vietnamese Peasant: His Value System,” which leaned heavily toward the lat-
ter view, portraying peasants as superstitious, isolated, xenophobic, and selfish.
Sweeping generalizations were encouraged by statements such as the supposed
fact that the peasant “likes war movies, perhaps because he can identify with
them.”72 This portrayal fit within the mainstream of a modernization dis-
course that lumped all “traditional” societies together. Still, it did present the
69. Debrief No. 15681, p. 2, in Box 97, GP, HIA.
70. Debrief No. 7666, p. 24, in Box 99, GP, HIA.
71. Ibid.
72. Attachment to memorandum by Leonard Marks to Johnson, 4 January 1966, p. 6, in Box 80,
WHCF, Subject File Ex CO 312, LBJL. The inclusion of this document on the training curriculum is
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worldview of the Vietnamese peasant as something to be worked with and
manipulated through propaganda rather than revolutionized by ushering the
peasant into modernity.
Although some advisers seemed to internalize this portrait of the “tradi-
tional” Vietnamese peasant, others believed that no special knowledge of Viet-
namese culture or society was needed to perform their jobs, arguing, in effect,
that once you had seen one farmer—whether Vietnamese or American—you
had seen them all.73 One adviser took comfort by assuring himself that the
Vietnamese farmer “probably wants the same thing that the farmer in Georgia
or Alabama wants.”74 This comparison, which was based not on intellectual
discourse but on the everyday experiences of advisers who hailed from a farm-
ing background, belied the traditional/modern distinction that lay at the heart
of modernization theory. Another adviser thought it would be fruitful to con-
sider that the Vietnamese were akin to “American Jews” rather than the “Ne-
gro or Mexican sub-cultures” because the Vietnamese were merit-oriented.75
One assistant province adviser, who was not fluent in Vietnamese, even went
so far as to claim that because the United States was a “basically democratic
society” without class distinctions, there was a wider gap between South Viet-
namese villagers and GVN officials than there was between U.S. advisers and
those same villagers.76 This assistant PSA, rather than seeing his task as bring-
ing the “traditional” rural dwellers into the “modern” world, placed his faith
in the idea that U.S. personnel and Vietnamese peasants were already basically
alike.
It was certainly convenient for the advisers to believe they understood
the villagers without the need for communication, given that the vast ma-
jority of the Americans could not speak Vietnamese. Still others drew more
realistic conclusions and did develop a sophisticated understanding of Viet-
namese rural society—or at least a healthy appreciation of the limits of their
own knowledge. One U.S. Army officer, with three years of experience as a
PSA by 1971, rejected easy generalizations about the Vietnamese and felt that
true wisdom lay in being aware of what one did not know. “Show me a person
who says he understands the Vietnamese,” he commented, “and I’ll show you
a person who only thinks he does.”77 Despite having views on race relations in
73. Debrief No. 126712, p. 2.
74. Debrief No. 16612, p. 16.
75. Debrief No. 25672, p. 23.
76. Debrief No. 6683, p. 9.
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the United States, “Earl” espoused careful sensitivity to the worldview of the
Vietnamese:
I haven’t had any cross-cultural problems myself. I realize that the Vietnamese
act and react differently than we do. If you go from Mississippi to Indiana you
will find people act and react differently. I think if your idea is to go over there
and help these people and you’re really interested in people, you’re not going to
have these problems.78
Some advisers avoided the generalizations that lumped all villagers to-
gether either as simple farmers akin to their U.S. counterparts or as devious
and selfish egotists; instead, they gained an appreciation of the complex social
and political structures of the villages and provinces in which they worked.
The most sophisticated of all realized that this complex structure often had
no overlap with the official GVN power structures with which they inter-
acted. In 1970, a deputy PSA in Phu Yen Province lamented that “there are
many undercurrents and back room politics that brew within the Province
that no American really knows about or understands.” He considered it diffi-
cult to know what the people really thought of the GVN because all he saw
was “what the Vietnamese want us to see.”79 Edward Lansdale, an expert on
counterinsurgency and psychological warfare who served in various roles in
South Vietnam from 1954 to 1968, believed that most U.S. advisers did not
have a sufficient understanding of the “rather highly organized” informal po-
litical structure that existed in each district and village. U.S. personnel tended
to interact with GVN officials more than anyone else, but there was often lit-
tle overlap between the formal structures of GVN power and the traditional
community leaders in the village.80 But gaining an understanding of the local
institutions required linguistic skills and cultural sensitivity that few advisers
could muster. Stereotypes and generalizations of various forms, though not
necessarily based on ideas about modernization, often took the place of so-
phisticated understanding.
In debriefings, advisers tended to have a lot more to say about their
counterparts than about the villagers. It was easy for the advisers to project
their own values onto the villagers because they were unable to communicate
with them. By contrast, advisers communicated extensively with their GVN
counterparts and often became aware of a gaping chasm in worldviews and
78. Debrief No. 4696, p. 2.
79. Memorandum by Donald Clark to HQ, 18 December 1970, p. 13, in Folder “End of tour report,”
Box 101, CORDS History Files, RG472, NARA.
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priorities. Advisers necessarily spent much of their time managing relation-
ships with their counterparts rather than focusing on reforms. Their ability
to achieve their developmental and strategic goals was proportionate to their
ability to influence the province and district chiefs to whom they were ac-
credited. A great deal of an adviser’s energy was taken up in managing this
relationship, and the need to do so pragmatically impaired any programmatic
approach to their jobs. They could not impose their will through coercion,
and, as the vignette that opened this article illustrates, they sometimes had
more to fear from their counterparts than vice versa. Most advisers believed
that establishing a belligerent or hectoring relationship with their counter-
parts would be counterproductive and instead viewed their role as more akin
to acting as diplomats, lobbyists, or even con men.81
Province chiefs were by definition survivors, having risen to field-grade
ranks in the ARVN by managing not to get killed or purged. Most U.S. ad-
visers hence found their counterparts to be cautious individuals who were
not easily persuaded to change their established patterns of behavior just be-
cause an enthusiastic new outsider had arrived in their orbit. U.S. advisers
were often struck by what they regarded as the lethargy of Vietnamese local
officials, and others complained that the chiefs knew little more about their
provinces than the U.S. advisers did. The chiefs frequently could not travel
around the provinces because the security situation was so bad.82 Some advis-
ers who clashed with their counterparts feared for their lives, although such
experiences were at the extreme end of the spectrum of ways that GVN offi-
cials could register their aversion to U.S. interference. A much more common
tactic was simply to stonewall or ignore U.S. requests.
Given the large numbers of U.S. advisers in South Vietnam, some in-
evitably got sidetracked from their mission in ways that strained relations with
the Vietnamese. Sexual relations were a particularly sensitive area. “Brad” felt
that a sure and common way for the U.S. advisers to annoy their Vietnamese
counterparts “is to speak of his women in this fashion that they are all over-
sexed little pots who are just laying around in their hammocks waiting for that
big American to come along and satisfy their beastly desires.”83 Many advis-
ers seemed to realize they were viewed negatively by their—always male—
GVN counterparts if they were known to be having a sexual relationship
with a Vietnamese woman, but one mused that this was a “problem” because
81. Debrief No. 8664, p. 3, in Box 94, GP, HIA (lobbyist); Debrief No. 206612, pp. 9–10 (diplomat);
and Debrief No. 7666, p. 8 (con man).
82. Debrief No. 166612, pp. 14–15, in Box 98, GP, HIA; and Debrief No. 30663, pp. 1–2.
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“Vietnamese women are very attractive.”84 This “problem” was often treated
in ways meant to be lighthearted, such as in a CORDS newsletter that noted:
“For the girl-watchers, An Giang is said to have the most beautiful women in
SVN, a statement that the men of CORDS/AG would heartily agree with.”85
The same newsletter published advice on administrative procedures for U.S.
personnel who wanted to marry Vietnamese women, which suggests the issue
was on the mind of many CORDS advisers.86 One noteworthy aspect was that
once a Vietnamese woman became the wife of a U.S. citizen, she became his
“dependent” and was required to leave the country for a “safe haven” such as
Bangkok, Manila, or Taipei.87 Given the access to financial security, consumer
goods, and even a foreign passport that U.S. personnel could offer Vietnamese
women, some viewed the “problem” of relations with them somewhat differ-
ently. One agriculturalist who served in 1967–1968 explained,
I find the Vietnamese women to be probably among the coldest and most cal-
culating of all women in the world. . . . They come out at the end of a year and
a half or two years smelling like a rose, with a nice bank account in Saigon or
even Switzerland and the American wonders what hit him. This happens pretty
often.88
For most CORDS advisers, the key task was how to manage day-to-day
relationships with their GVN counterparts, and this conundrum often forced
them into compromises. Although advisers had some limited leeway to act
unilaterally, they found they could achieve almost nothing without the coop-
eration of local officials. “This is the Vietnamese country and we’re advisers,”
explained one American who served in 1966.
This is one of the things we have to realize—we are nothing but advisers and
when we act in any capacity other than advisers we are out of our element. I
think that persuasion is the word that is necessary and I think that it is very
necessary to be able to persuade by being knowledgeable and know what we’re
doing.89
84. Debrief No. 24687, 17. See also Debrief No. 18672, pp. 2–3, in Box 98, GP, HIA.
85. CFAA newsletter, No. 8, February 1972, p. 9, in Folder “CFAA Newsletters, 1971–72,” Box 45,
CORDS History Files, RG472, NARA.
86. Ibid., pp. 13–17.
87. CFAA newsletter, No. 1, 24 May 1971, p. 2, in Folder “CFAA Newsletters, 1971–72,” Box 45,
CORDS History Files, RG472, NARA.
88. Debrief No. 24681, p. 78, in Box 100, GP, HIA.
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Another adviser, who served in I Corps in the same year, felt that doing any-
thing against the wishes of the province chief was unwise. “The day when
we start going this way and he wants to go the other way,” he believed, “our
usefulness is terminated.” The application of careful persuasion after gaining
the chief’s trust—which this adviser believed could take four or five months,
more than one-third of the length of an advisory tour—was the only way
to go.90 Most advisers operated circumspectly, believing that hostile relations
with their counterpart would destroy their ability to operate. Guidance sent
to all PSAs noted that advice should be given to the province chief “in privacy
so that he will not lose face when passing it to subordinates.”91 As a behind-
the-scenes counsel and manipulator, advisers clearly had some power but still
relied on their local partner. Even if the advisers had been inclined to act as
zealous modernizers, their capacity to do so would have been almost nil. In
1970, Louis F. Janowski, an FSO who served in various advisory positions
in IV Corps, stated in his end-of-tour report: “Too often good counterpart
relations simply means letting your counterpart do exactly what he wants or
raising minimal objects [sic] to his actions.”92
Almost no adviser regarded his counterpart as a puppet who was easy to
manipulate into doing what the adviser wanted. “Brad” described the handi-
caps the advisers faced in interacting with their counterparts on an equal basis.
“In the first place,” he began,
let’s face it, you probably tower over the guy, you weigh twice what he does,
you probably are enjoying a salary several times his, and you have all kinds of
amenities that he probably does not enjoy, such as access to the PX and all the
goodies therein.93
Advisers could also leave the country if they had to, whereas GVN officials
could not. According to Brad, these disparities meant: “You’re starting the re-
lationship under a hell of a handicap, and it’s a miracle that the guy doesn’t
hate your guts on sight.”94 It was also extremely difficult for advisers to grasp
the context in which their counterparts operated. A U.S. adviser faced with
90. Debrief No. 4668, p. 18, in Box 101, GP, HIA.
91. Memorandum from Wagonhurst to all PSAs, n.d., pp. 6–7, in Folder “End of tour report,” Box
102, CORDS History Files, NARA.
92. Attachment to Lee Braddock to James Eagle, 21 October 1970, in Folder “POL 7: Visits, trip
reports, 1970,” Box 9, Subject Files of the Office of Vietnam Affairs (Vietnam Working Group),
RG59, NARA.
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the task of understanding the political, cultural, social and economic intrica-
cies affecting Phu Yen’s province chief in 1968 confronted the same task that
a Vietnamese would have faced if parachuted into California and ordered to
understand the priorities of Governor Ronald Reagan. One document, writ-
ten by an experienced adviser and distributed for the edification of his PSA
colleagues, listed 64 questions about the counterpart’s religious affiliations,
business interests, sex life, political links, and educational background—the
answers to which could bear on his behavior.95 Few U.S. advisers were
equipped to understand any of these factors, and the language barrier only
exacerbated the problem.
One of the main issues facing CORDS advisers on a daily basis was en-
couraging their counterparts to focus on helping the rural population even
when this did not accord with the counterparts’ own interests or priorities. Be-
cause almost all provincial chiefs were ARVN officers with limited experience
in understanding rural life, the PSAs could find it difficult to get them to agree
on the importance of such efforts.96 By late 1971 a CORDS briefer reported
that in rural South Vietnam “the center of power rests with the province chief,
who is by and large an Army Colonel, does not have an M.A. in Economics
or Public administration, and has been fighting a war all his life.” The chief’s
characteristic response to being told to involve himself in civil matters, the
briefer said, was “to have nothing to do with it because he would have noth-
ing to say.”97 Vann likewise considered the GVN to be “dominated by mili-
tary men who have to be coerced into performing civil functions, and it was a
strange role for them to perform.”98
The district level of government was where programs were actually imple-
mented and was the echelon at which GVN officials had most contact with
villagers. Although no one knew for sure given the ravages of the war, official
U.S. publications estimated that South Vietnam comprised 2,100 to 2,552
villages, which were further subdivided into some 10,000–12,000 hamlets.99
Given the enormous variety of political, economic, and social circumstances
in each village, CORDS advisers could not possibly have detailed knowledge
95. Memorandum from Wagonhurst to all PSAs, n.d., p. 4;< emphasis in original.
96. Debrief No. 3681, p. 16; and Debrief No. 2667, p. 2.
97. Task force minutes, program “CDD,” September 1971, p. 8, in Folder “Heilman minutes of task
force meetings/Taken from Chamber’s safe, folder I,” Box 80, CORDS History Files, RG472, NARA.
98. Task force minutes, program “CORDS/PP&P and Mr. John Vann,” 11 October 1971, p. 19,
in Folder “Heilman minutes of task force meetings/Taken from Chamber’s safe, folder I,” Box 80,
CORDS History Files, RG472, NARA.
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of them all, making relations with local district chiefs of paramount impor-
tance. By focusing on ensuring that the district chief governed effectively and
promoted reform, CORDS advisers could hope to influence the numerous
villages in each district chief’s area. One adviser noted that “[m]any programs
and other regular governmental activities will either succeed, be perverted, or
fail because of the district and the far ranging influence of the district chief.”100
Yet district chiefs were commonly considered to be even less concerned than
province chiefs about civil administration.101
Advisers deployed various methods of manipulation. Most tried to see
their counterpart at least daily and to develop social relationships with them.
By offering advisers access to the U.S. provincial organizations’ technical
knowledge on matters such as agriculture, as well as access to the resources that
CORDS was willing to invest in local development and reform programs, ad-
visers could become valuable to their counterparts. Yet most advisers believed
they should not appear too indispensable lest they undermine the appearance
of the province chief’s autonomy and sovereignty within his own province.
One adviser commented: “It was very difficult to work in such a manner to
try to get things done and to control things while, at the same time, present-
ing the facade that I was not manipulating anything.”102 Another described
his job as akin to a lobbyist, but one who did not want to appear to be too
close to the politician who was being lobbied. “Try not to give the overly [sic]
impression that you are with him all the time,” he advised, “because he either
resents it or if he doesn’t resent it, he starts looking like an American pup-
pet.”103 With factors such as these limiting the direct influence the advisers
could have on a province chief, some attempted indirect means of influence,
such as developing closer relationships with the province chief’s deputies. By
planting ideas further down the GVN hierarchy and then endorsing those
ideas when they came across the province chief’s desk, advisers could main-
tain a facade of noninterference. They could also send their area specialists
to advise and persuade lower levels of the GVN hierarchy, including cajoling
the chiefs of villages and hamlets to request help from the province chief as
a way of stimulating activity without it seeming to be externally inspired.104
100. Document, “The District as an Institution,” n.d., p. 1, in Folder “GVN correspondence / Camp
surveys,” Box 15, CORDS History Files, RG472, NARA.
101. Document with attachments, subject “Strengthening of Local Government,” 3 October 1969, in
Folder “Economic warfare files—local government,” Box 17, CDD Records, RG472, NARA.
102. Debrief No. 30663, p. 8.
103. Debrief No. 8664, pp. 2–3.
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However, such interventions seemed to undermine the long-term goal of fos-
tering an independent GVN.
All of these factors limited CORDS advisers’ ability to implement a U.S.
agenda and instead made them captives to the will of their GVN counterparts.
The extent to which advisers could “modernize” GVN rural administration—
even if they had wanted to—had its limits. This was illustrated most clearly
by the example of corruption. Although the exact scale of corruption in South
Vietnam is impossible to determine, especially insofar as it was carried out in
petty ways at the province level and below, it was endemic throughout the pe-
riod of CORDS’s existence. The rural population whose allegiance was vital
to the war effort suffered under myriad forms of petty graft. Far from act-
ing as ruthless modernizers who attempted to stamp out the practice, most
advisers were unwilling to interfere, for fear of wiping away the grease that
kept the wheels of provincial administration turning. A handbook for advisers
noted in 1971 that corruption was the “pervasive vice” of Vietnamese admin-
istration and was not to be dealt with through “denunciations and counter-
denunciations.”105 One of the generation of advisers who replaced the Tigers
complained that some of his predecessors had been too “idealistic.” Voicing a
commonly held view, he explained that corruption was an accepted norm “in
more countries of the world than not” and was not something to be “overly
disturbed” by.106 “The American attitude seems to be based on the assump-
tion that corrupt practices are part of their way of life and must be accepted,”
stated one long-serving official, “Frank,” in 1967. “Objections are based not
upon kind but degree. A certain level is permissible, but more than this calls
for corrective action. I subscribe to this view myself.”107 “Frank” saw 10 per-
cent of cash or 25 percent of construction materials as an out-of-hand level of
corruption, whereas others saw 10 percent cash as acceptable.108 Such views
were widespread, and advisers routinely came to overlook corruption. Many
advisers drew a distinction between “necessary” corruption and abuses aimed
at making individuals conspicuously wealthy.109 Vann was said to differentiate
between “good corruption” and “dirty corruption.”110 This distinction under-
lay the words of a USAID employee who said in 1968 that corruption was
a “cancer” but also “the lubricant by which everything moves.” Remove the
105. The Vietnamese Village, pp. 86–87.
106. Debrief No. 56610, p. 6, in Box 100, GP, HIA.
107. Debrief No. 15681, p. 31.
108. Ibid., p. 32; and Debrief No. 6683, p. 4.
109. Debrief No. 126712, pp. 7–8.








s_a_00984.pdf by guest on 24 April 2021
Rural Government Advisers in South Vietnam
lubricant, he warned, and it “would be like removing all of the grease from
a machine.”111 Seen this way, the adviser’s role was to avoid rocking the boat
too much lest it overturn.
The conditions under which U.S. advisers served in rural Vietnam were
not conducive to the implementation of grand plans or reform programs. The
advisers thus had to chart their own course, working with the counterparts
available and in accordance with their own limited understanding of Viet-
namese language, government, and society. The story of U.S. rural advisers in
South Vietnam is not the story of one theory rigidly applied; rather, it is the
sum total of the advisers’ individual struggles. Unable to speak Vietnamese or
understand local political dynamics, the advisers were outsiders to the gov-
ernmental structure and society they were attempting to reform. Their lack
of detailed understanding of the true power dynamics of either the GVN or
Vietnamese rural society made it difficult for them to act. Furthermore, the
need to work through their GVN counterparts led to compromises with the
needs and preferences of the very individuals whose actions they were sup-
posedly there to change. This was especially clear on the issue of corruption.
Many advisers ultimately bowed to the needs of their counterparts and ac-
cepted the argument that it was unrealistic to expect the GVN to run both
efficiently and honestly in a time of war. Even if the advisers had wished to
tackle the problem, their status as lonely and confused outsiders made them
possible targets of stonewalling, obfuscation, or even a gun barrel to the back
of the head.
Conclusion
The U.S. rural advisory network in South Vietnam developed over time,
growing from a small effort modeled after the Peace Corps into a large,
bureaucratized machine that deployed dozens of civilian advisers to every
province of South Vietnam under military auspices. Despite the lamentations
of the Tigers, this development was inevitable given the vast U.S. military
buildup in the country from 1965 onward and the strategic importance of
successful nation-building in South Vietnam. The rural advisory effort un-
derwent both qualitative and quantitative change throughout the 1960s, as
the young, idealistic Tigers were replaced by more experienced individuals
recruited in the United States or transferred from other agencies. The U.S.
government attempted to produce, on a crash basis, a cadre of advisers with
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expertise on South Vietnam and the cultural and political sensitivity to be
effective nation-building agents.
Yet, despite the perceived importance of the Vietnam War to U.S. na-
tional interests and the Cold War—and the establishment of the only U.S.
training school dedicated to producing expertise solely on one particular
country—the effort was a failure. The history of the program is a reminder
that although the United States has taken a global view of its interests both
during and after the Cold War, it has encountered formidable limits on its
ability to understand and influence the politics even of the countries with
which it is most intensely concerned.
By demonstrating how the rural advisory program evolved over the course
of the “Decade of Development”—often in response to conflicts within the
development community, such as between the Tigers and the old guard of
USAID—this article suggests the value of moving beyond a focus on one
particular ideological tendency, such as modernization, and instead taking a
detailed look at how Cold War development interventions were experienced
from the ground up. Doing so can help achieve more nuanced understandings
of the history of key U.S. nation-building efforts during the Cold War. Only
by looking at the varied experiences of the many thousands of individual U.S.
rural government advisers in South Vietnam can we understand the reality of
how the U.S. nation-building effort there “actually operated.”112 Examining
how the advisers struggled against their own powerlessness to understand or
influence their surroundings—often with nothing more than the can-do at-
titude that had been encapsulated in Fraleigh’s rallying cry of “You can do
it, Tiger!”—is more pertinent than an analysis of ideological discourse in the
metropole to understanding the reality of the nation-building effort.
The emphasis placed here on the heterogeneity of the views and experi-
ences of nation-builders is especially appropriate in the case of the Vietnam
War, where—as in so many other aspects of the conflict—U.S. involvement
was distinguished by its sheer scale. As the new source base tapped for this
article demonstrates, the average U.S. adviser involved in the effort was not a
doctrinaire proponent of modernization theory and did not have the training
and opportunity to develop the sophisticated understanding of South Viet-
nam sported by individuals such as Lansdale or Vann, who have occupied an
outsized position in the literature to date.113 Instead, advisers brought to their
112. Ekbladh, Great American Mission, p. 11.
113. On Lansdale and Vann, see Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in
Vietnam (New York: Vintage, 1989); Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American (New
York: Houghton Mifflin, 1989); and Jonathan Nashel, Edward Lansdale’s Cold War (Amherst, MA:
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role the array of preconceptions, temperaments, and aptitudes that might be
expected of any large group of individuals. Focusing on the experiences of this
“average” adviser suggests the value of looking at policy implementation at the
micro level to see how the ideas and imperatives that shape U.S. foreign policy
actually play out in practice. The micro level of interaction between individ-
ual U.S. advisers and their foreign counterparts—the level, that is, at which
U.S. foreign policy meets U.S. foreign relations—is where the most interesting
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